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Abstract 
Currently, there is much interest in stimulating or ‘speeding up’ socio-technical transitions to 
sustainable systems, most notably in the sectors of energy, transport and agriculture. This essay 
attempts to assess whether and how ‘transition’ type problems and issues are being addressed in 
the various sub-disciplines and methodological approaches of economics. This allows us to 
identify concepts, ideas, theories and empirical methods in economics that are suitable for 
inclusion and elaboration in ‘transition research’. Surprisingly, we find that many sub-
disciplines of economics have in one way or another addressed problems similar to transitions. 
Our main conclusion therefore is that economics offers a rich palette of ideas that may be useful 
for transition research. Studies on development stages, long waves, technological path-
dependency, conflict resolution, public investments, emergence of institutions and, transitions 
from communist to market-democracy systems seem especially relevant to the study of 
transition. Although mainstream economics conflicts in certain ways with the approach called 
for by many involved in transition research, we show that economics certainly has something to 
offer to the study of transitions.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent discussions of sustainable development often present the concept of ‘transition’ as a 
generalized notion of system innovations (e.g., Board on Sustainable Development, 2000; Raskin 
et al., 2002; Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 2002, 2005; Rotmans, 2003; Smith et al., 2005).  A 
transition comprises a society-wide change that goes beyond single sectors and involves 
fundamental and interrelated changes in technology, organisation, institutions and culture. The 
notion of ‘transition’ can be viewed as a response to the problem associated with the fact that 
many studies of sustainable development are restricted to formulating or portraying a hypothetical 
and utopian sustainable system (i.e., a ‘blueprint’) while it remains unclear how such a system 
can be realized. The shifting of the focal point from a sustainable ‘end state’ to the transition 
process that transforms the current, unsustainable system into a sustainable state, adds realism 
and policy relevance to the analysis. Transition studies are thus aimed at assessing the processes 
that initiate, foster and direct transitions as well as the barriers against transitions.  
 In the Netherlands, the national government has made a commitment to stimulate 
transitions in energy, agriculture, built environment and transport. In addition, a 20 million € 
research programme (KSI) has been established to increase knowledge about transitions. The 
programme aims to generate both fundamental knowledge about transition processes, including 
typologies of transitions, causal mechanisms, and ways in which transitions and related co-
dynamic processes can be studied. In addition, it aims to produce practical knowledge that can be 
used to the benefit of ongoing transition experiments in the Netherlands, which are fostered by 
the ministries of economics and the environment. Both aims are realized through three areas of 
research:2 
1) Historical research of past transitions, which allows drawing theoretical as well as policy 
lessons. In particular, this tries to learn about the teleological nature of past transitions, 
the role of co-dynamics of sub-systems, visions, expectations, and collective action in 
bringing about transitions. 
2) Systematic analysis and monitoring of current transitions and analysis of hypothetical, 
future transitions, with a special focus on mobility, health care and, agriculture. 
3) Research on the governance (steering and management) of transitions, looking at the co-
dynamics of sub-systems. 
 
 Transitions can be conceptualised as non-linear processes of change, involving four 
stages, namely predevelopment, take-off, acceleration or breakthrough, and stabilisation 
(Rotmans, et al., 2001). Steering of transitions is difficult if not impossible, as they involve 
complex interactions between subsystems (co-dynamics) of the social-economic-technological-
institutional system. Even when a government commits itself to a certain transition, it cannot 
control the transition in a top-down manner, if only because it itself is a central part of the change. 
Kemp et al. (2006) have developed a model of transition management based on such 
things as ‘dynamic agendas’ and ‘adaptive programmes’. Transitions are regarded here as 
involving changes at three levels, namely of niche, regime and (socio-technical) landscape. A 
transition requires synchronicity and interaction of developments in different domains, which 
often involves mutual reinforcement (Rotmans, et al., 2001). Within the multilevel scheme, 
producers are part of a production regime and a technological regime based on a certain body of 
knowledge with links to science and tacit elements. Users are part of a user regime, characterised 
by income, (changing) preferences, habits, capabilities and modes of social interaction. They are 
constituted (configured) by certain capabilities, values, beliefs and roles. In addition to producer, 
user and, technology regimes, there are regimes of policy, science, socio-cultural activities and, 
market functioning. Developments in one regime influence developments in another regime 
                                                 
2 For an overview of KSI projects see http://www.ksinetwork.nl/?content=projects. 
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(Geels and Kemp, 2005), which leads to co-dynamics or even coevolution (see Section 3.2). 
Niches are domains where radical innovations emerge. In other words, they act as ‘incubation 
rooms’ for radical novelties, shielding them from mainstream market selection, acting as stepping 
stone for further change (Schot, 1998). The macro-level is formed by the socio-technical 
landscape, which refers to aspects of the exogenous environment. This includes macroeconomic 
and international conditions, politics, cultural and normative values, environmental problems and 
scarce resources. It further includes the material and spatial configurations and arrangements of 
cities, factories, and physical (road and energy) infrastructure (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002, 
2005). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interaction between different scale-levels 
Source: Geels (2002). 
  
There are different types of transitions. History depicts both relatively large and small 
transitions. Examples of large transitions include the invention and spread of fire control, the rise 
of agriculture, the Industrial Revolution and, the emergence of mass-production/consumption. 
Smaller transitions are the Green Revolution in agriculture, the electrification of society, various 
transitions in transportation (e.g., horse/wagon to car) and, certain energy transitions (e.g., from 
coal to gas). The notion of (a small) transition may also be regarded to cover transformations in 
human communication (e.g., mobile phone, email, internet), and work organization and 
manufacturing (i.e., from handcraft to mass manufacturing and flexible production). Finally, 
transitions have spatial dimensions or repercussions: cities and regions go through transitions as 
part of wider, global transitions; associated with this, trade patterns between regions and countries 
change. Kemp and Rotmans (2005) distinguish two types of transitions: goal-oriented transitions 
and evolutionary (non-teleological) transitions. Geels and Schot (2005) make a distinction 
between five transition pathways, namely transformation, opening up of new functional domain, 
technological substitution, de-alignment and, re-alignment. In addition, one can identify a number 
of challenges in analyzing transitions. See Table 2 in Section 4 for further illustration. 
To date, economists have not contributed much to the elaboration of the notion of 
‘sustainability transitions’. Nevertheless, they traditionally have devoted much attention to the 
study of long term growth and development as well as to the (optimal) planning of these. In 
addition, they have developed policy theories based on incentive mechanisms, which have also 
had wide application to environmental and resource regulatory problems. Economists have 
stressed that in many (but not all) circumstances decentralization through price incentives gives 
the best outcomes from a social welfare perspective. The various mainstream economic theories 
have not directly addressed transition challenges like path-dependence, lock-in, diversity of 
options, bounded rationality and, uncertainty. In this sense, there is a gap and even a conflict 
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between mainstream economics and the transition paradigm. Although we pay attention to this 
possible conflict, the current paper adopts a constructive approach by examining which useful 
ideas and suggestions for transition research can be derived from the rich literature on economics, 
both within mainstream (neoclassical) and heterodox economic schools. In particular, we will try 
to collect the most exciting ideas from a range of possibly relevant sub-disciplines of economics. 
In addition, we will examine the relevance of methodological approaches common in economics 
to address transition issues. 
Even though the specific notion of transition is not used much in economics, several 
economic concepts and terms bear close relationship to it. Examples are development, growth, 
structural change, (system) innovation and, transformation. So far, the term ‘transition’ has 
appeared in only three areas of economic research. In theoretical, dynamic models of growth, a 
transition is sometimes used to denote the change from one state to another stationary 
(equilibrium) state. This resembles some of the interpretations commonly attached to ‘transition’ 
in the context of sustainable development, notably the association with a major technological 
innovation. A second area in which the notion ‘transition’ has been used is the study of processes 
characterizing the transformation from a planned to a market economy (notably, the former 
communist USSR and Eastern-European countries). A third, somewhat related field of research in 
which the term ‘transition’ is employed, is that of development economics, which analyses the 
conditions under which poor, rural countries can change into modern market-based economies, 
characterized by a more educated labour force, a more balanced and elaborate sector structure, 
with well-functioning markets, and less dependence on resource exports and foreign aid by rich 
countries. 
This illustrates that the idea of transition is not entirely new. Moreover, transitions are not 
hypothetical constructs: history is full of them. This suggests a potentially important role for 
(economic) historical analyses. The main difference between many historical transitions and the 
ones envisioned in the context of a sustainable development is that whereas the first type are with 
few exceptions autonomous and unintended, the latter arguably require purposeful public 
guidance and interference. We will suggest here that the discipline of economics can provide 
useful insights about the latter. This is not surprising perhaps in view of its long-standing 
tradition of dealing with concrete policy questions – witnessed by, among others, economic sub-
disciplines such as environmental and public economics. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 assesses the main methodological 
approaches and sub-disciplines of economics that contain potentially relevant ideas on transitions. 
Next, Section 3 presents a selection of the most promising approaches and sub-disciplines with a 
brief discussion of their core notions and insights. Section 4 summarizes the insights by linking 
transition challenges to economic theories and concepts. Section 5 discusses the potential conflict 
between mainstream economics and the ‘transition governance paradigm’. Section 6 provides a 
summary and conclusions. 
 
2. An overview of relevant economic approaches and sub-disciplines 
This section attempts to assess various ideas (i.e., concepts, theories, approaches and insights) 
from the broad spectrum of economics that have the potential to benefit the recent, emerging 
thinking on transitions. Such ideas may contribute to an improved understanding of transition 
phases and processes, elements of transition management, and barriers to transitions. For this 
purpose, we identify two levels of organisation within the discipline of economics.  
The first level of organisation focuses on the methodological starting point. This includes:  
• neoclassical (micro)economics (including partial and general equilibrium theory and game 
theory), 
• macroeconomics (including various ´schools´ of thought, such as new and post-Keynesian 
economics, new classical economics, supply side economics, disequilibrium theories and 
monetarism), 
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• classical economics (internally heterogeneous – linked especially to early economists such as 
Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill), and, 
• various (other) heterodox schools (e.g., behavioural economics, evolutionary economics, 
Austrian economics, Sraffian economics and institutional economics). 
 
The second level of organisation focuses on the sub-disciplines. The following list outlines 
the sub-disciplines considered most relevant for the purpose of transition research (core issues 
and concepts are indicated in brackets): 
• business cycle theory (long waves), 
• development economics (micro, macro, industrialization, institutional arrangements, 
international linkages, development planning, trade policy), 
• economic growth theory (endogenous growth, multisectoral growth, comparative studies of 
countries), 
• economic history (general, technological, industries, geography and regions, institutions), 
• economic studies of transition economies (former socialist/communist countries), 
• economics of disasters (disaster as unlocking a system), 
• economics of information (decision-making under uncertainty and imperfect or asymmetric 
information, learning theories,  search, network formation), 
• economics of technology (innovation systems, positive externalities, diffusion, intellectual 
property rights, subsidies), 
• environmental and energy economics (regulation, resource curse or Dutch disease, resource 
pricing, and extraction), 
• industrial economics (market structure, innovation strategies, rent seeking, cooperation, 
complementary products, networks, vertical integration, and demography of industries), 
• international economics (trade, location, cooperation, innovation and international diffusion), 
• marketing (life cycle of products, and market and innovation strategies), 
• population economics (interaction between individual choices, economic development and 
demography), 
• public economics (public goods, public investment, public R&D, infrastructure, club theory, 
public and social choice, conflict resolution), and, 
• spatial economics (regional diversity, spatial isolation, spatial diffusion, agglomeration 
theory, new economic geography, economic effects of infrastructure).  
 
In the next section we provide a brief overview of core aspects for a select number of 
methodological approaches and sub-disciplines listed above, judging each against the context of 
the potential for transitions. Section 3.1 focuses on methodology and, Section 3.2 on sub-
disciplines. 
 
3. A selection of economic insights with potential relevance for transition research 
3.1 Methodological approaches 
Classical economics 
Classical economists’ concern with historical change suggests relevance for transition research. 
They study the mechanisms of transformations occurring in economic and social life. Their 
economic analysis is mixed with sociological analysis of social relations (struggle). The 
multidisciplinary nature of this approach to analysis explains why early economists like Malthus 
and Marx are considered ‘early’ sociologists by those working in sociology.  
David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill regarded the economy as moving towards a steady state. 
From Ricardo’s point of view, this was due to diminishing returns to increasingly marginal land 
used for agriculture, and from Mill’s point of view, it was due to diminishing returns to utility. 
Daly (1977/1991) emphasized the notion of a steady state economy, later referred to as an 
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environmental sustainable economy, with a minimal material and energetic throughput and a 
stable population. Malthus believed population control was the major problem, as food scarcity 
would become urgent, and as such, he proposed restraint as the most effective and realistic 
approach. Classical economists generally believed that land was (still) an important and scarce 
production factor (Hubacek and van den Bergh, 2005). This changed dramatically due to 
industrialization, which marginalized agriculture.  The new point of view was reflected in the 
neoclassical economics paradigm by a shift in emphasis to the production factors, labour and 
capital, resulting (initially) in a disregard for the fundamental role of natural resources. 
 
Grand development theories: Marx, Schumpeter and Rostow 
Classical and other economists have proposed grand development theories. Karl Marx, Joseph 
Schumpeter and Walt Rostow (1960) are the most important ones. They combined an interest in 
theory with an interest in history, not just economic history but also social and political history. 
They did not focus on economic change at the margin but on how different elements of historical 
change are mutually connected and on the discontinuities rather than trend-like changes. Marx 
and Schumpeter both believed that capitalist systems would go through a transition ending in a 
socialist system. Marx developed a political transition theory with a period of proletarian 
dictatorship in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Class struggle (a sort of group theory) 
was a crucial mechanism in his theory.  
Schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1942) thought that the neoclassical notion of equilibrium was 
problematic, as he regarded capitalism as a process that can never be stationary. Schumpeter´s 
view of capitalism was built around the notion of “creative destruction”, denoting a “process of 
industrial mutation (…) that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (original italics, Schumpeter, 
1976, p. 83).  
 Like Marx, Rostow (1960) developed a multi-stage theory of development, not towards a 
communist society but towards a consumer society. His five-stage framework described the 
stages that poor, developing countries must pass through in order to become modern market 
economies. These stages comprise the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the 
actual take-off, the drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. This theory resembles life-
cycle theories common in marketing, aimed at describing the development of products and 
markets. Rostow set out a number of conditions that were likely to occur in investment, 
consumption and social trends during each stage. The stages, the length of transitions periods and 
the conditions may vary from country to country and region to region. Rostow attached great 
importance to political change, most notably the building of an effective national state and 
commitment to modernization, as an important precondition for take-off. Maturity (mass 
consumption) is reached after some 60 years after the beginning of take-off. The impetus for 
growth comes from new technology, diffusing across various sectors, ultimately leading towards 
the production of consumer goods and services as leading sectors. Rostow´s systematic, detailed 
theory certainly deserves serious attention from transition researchers. A similar stage model of 
industry development around technology evolution focusing on skills, investment and location is 
offered by Perez and Soete (1988). Today however many economists are criticial about the view 
of economic development moving towards stationary states, not just neoclassical economists but 
also evolutionary economists such as Harvey and Metcalfe (2005) who regard capitalistic systems 
as restless and unsettling. 
 
Neoclassical economics 
The dominant methodology within the current discipline of economics is neoclassical economic 
theory. Central to it is the assumption that agents – households, firms and public agencies – act 
rationally or individually optimally (i.e. they consistently maximize a given utility or profit 
function). Neoclassical economics focuses its attention on market relationships, as such its policy 
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theory derives from the idea that market failures, causing a deviation between market equilibrium 
and a social welfare optimum, should be appropriately corrected. Suggestions resulting from this 
approach that are relevant to the understanding of transitions can be summarized as follows (see 
also den Butter and Hofkes, 2004): 
• Prices (neglected in many perspectives on transitions) coordinate economic choices, 
including demand, supply, investment in capital and outlays on R&D. 
• Negative externalities due to environmental pollution and positive externalities of R&D and 
innovation need to be internalized. 
• Changes take the form of smooth trends (growth theory, rational expectations) and smooth 
substitution process (equilibrium theory) rather than sudden breaks. Economic change is 
governed by prices signalling relative scarcity, including those of natural resources. 
• Old, obsolete techniques are gradually replaced by new, more profitable techniques (vintage 
capital models). 
 
Traditional (general) equilibrium theory is a special case of game theory, where the latter 
generalizes types of human interactions, not only market, possibly repeated, but strategic 
(expectations about others´ behaviour). Transitions can be conceptualised as non-zero sum, 
dynamic (sequential) and, coordination games. A number of insights from game theory relevant 
to transitions follow. A central insight of game theory is the prisoner dilemma: individual 
rationality combined with non-cooperation can lead to an outcome that is sub-optimal from an 
individual and a social perspective. Repeated interaction, negotiation (a convention, standard or 
institution) or coordination (information sharing, or exchange and complementary specialization), 
can assist in solving this type of problem. Coordination games can be characterized by multiple 
equilibria. Any observed or resulting equilibrium is then a matter of arbitrariness or randomness, 
but may be purposefully stimulated by agreeing on norms or setting uniform standards. 
Evolutionary game theory has been developed partly in response to this ´equilibrium selection´ 
problem. Transitions involve many strategic interactions between different agents which might be 
caste in game theoretical terms. 
 Many of the specific insights arise from the application of general neoclassical economic 
theory in sub-disciplines, as examined in the next section. In addition, in Section 5, we will 
consider the potential conflict between mainstream neoclassical economics and transition 
thinking, as noted by some transition researchers. 
 
Behavioural economics 
Whereas neoclassical economics assumes that individual agents are rational, a new school, 
behavioural economics, works along different lines. Behavioural economics, overlaps with and is 
motivated by experimental economics and economic psychology. The three approaches have 
pointed convincingly at the shortcomings of the neoclassical economics approach on the basis of 
philosophical and theoretical arguments as well as empirical and experimental evidence (e.g., 
Caldwell, 1984; Conlisk, 1996). In response to this, a range of alternative models have been 
proposed to address particular aspects of bounded rationality (Camerer et al., 2003). Transition 
research calls for studies addressing barriers to change, including those relating to individuals and 
organizations making decisions characterized by bounded rationality 
 Herbert Simon was the first to systematically argue that the combination of imperfect and 
costly information and limited capacity of the human brain implies a procedural rather than a 
substantial type of rationality, resulting in ‘satisficing’ behaviour: individuals try to attain 
acceptable rather than optimal levels of welfare, profit or other indicators. From a ‘hierarchy of 
needs’ (Maslow) or lexicographic preference perspective it is argued that needs have a 
hierarchical order. For instance, higher needs, such as the desire for music, would not appear 
before the lower needs, like satisfying hunger, are satisfied. Empirical happiness or subjective 
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well-being research has further established that humans adapt to changing circumstances 
(preference drift) and value relative (income) positions and status goods (reference drift, rivalry in 
consumption) (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). Imitation (bandwagon effect) is related 
to this, most notably with regard to conspicuous consumption or status goods. In addition, our 
social behaviour is complex. Penn (2003) notes that environmental regulation should, for 
instance, take social interactions (e.g., reputation effects) into account. This is consistent with the 
findings of economic psychology and experimental economics, and of group selection theory 
(Henrich, 2004). Group phenomena can be linked to a variety of social – non-selfish or other-
regarding – preferences: reciprocal fairness, inequity aversion, pure altruism, altruistic 
punishment, and spite or envy (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).  
 Various theories deal with behaviour under uncertainty, prospect theory being the most 
influential one. Motivated by experiments, it stresses the asymmetry with which individuals 
perceive gains and losses. ‘Habits and routines’ are often regarded as a straightforward approach 
to deal with complexity and uncertainty. Finally, according to some theories, under highly 
uncertain conditions behaviour takes the form of imitation, an example of which is panic selling. 
Such imitation leads to a reduction in the diversity of individual behavioural strategies. 
 These various views on individual behaviour are relevant to transition research, as they 
provide clues to such different issues as imitation on the demand side in relation to lock-in, 
emergence of niche markets, investment and R&D decisions, strategic interaction of individuals, 
and relevant policy goals. For example, happiness research has shown that growth of individual 
welfare is not always equivalent to growth in consumption or income, if only because the rivalry 
game for status goods is at best a zero-sum game (Layard, 2005). 
 
Evolutionary economics 
Evolutionary economics is perhaps the most internally consistent and formalized alternative 
theory to neoclassical economics. Its starting point is formed by one or more populations of 
elements (agents, strategies, organizations, institutions or technologies) which are characterized 
by internal diversity (heterogeneity). The latter can change in two directions: it can increase 
through innovations and decrease through selection (adoption, imitation, diffusion) (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  The model of evolution points to the cumulative nature of these changes and the 
associated (mostly) gradual adaptation of individual elements to their environment (possibly 
changing) which is comprised of economic, social and ecological conditions. Evolution thus 
represents a population dynamics approach to transitions.  
Potts (2000) has formulated an interesting proposal for the future direction of 
evolutionary economics.  He presents a type of axiomatic foundation for evolutionary economics. 
In his view, economic systems are complex ‘hyperstructures’ (i.e., nested sets of connections 
among components). Connections can represent the physical connections between components in 
products or machines, as well as the material and information flows between  individuals or 
departments within an organization. In this case, economic change and growth of knowledge are 
in essence the process of changes between connections. One thing is evident: new products, new 
firms and new sectors rise and old ones disappear, while firm ‘growth’ and economic ‘growth’ 
are essentially processes creating new and losing old connections, as well as grouping those 
connections or hyperstructure dynamics. In line with the idea of changing connections, Potts calls 
for a new microeconomics based on the technique of discrete, combinatorial mathematics, similar 
to graph theory, to study the change of microeconomic connections. In addition, Potts’ approach 
can be viewed as a fundamental discussion of the need for multi-agent or population models, also 
known as ´artificial life´ models. He also seems to suggest that all connections have a spatial 
dimension as well, implying the relevance of the ‘geometry of space’.  
The emergence of new levels of reality through the grouping of connections offers a 
refreshing perspective on transitions, similar to the way in which they are perceived in biology 
(e.g., from molecules to cell to multicellular organism to animal groups). Not surprisingly, 
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transitions are also recognized and given much attention in evolutionary biology (Maynard Smith 
and Szathmáry, 1995). The emergence sequence suggests increasing complexity fed by a larger 
degree or a higher level of specialisation, labour division and cooperation. This process might be  
the key to fostering transitions. The essence of evolution is that its’ transitions result from self-
organisation based on evolutionary principles and that regulation can only guide the evolutionary 
mechanisms rather than control a transition. 
Next, the concept of coevolution provides a promising direction for research on 
transitions. In a strict sense, coevolution occurs when interactive populations evolve subject to 
interactions taking the form of mutual selection. In other words, two evolutionary processes are 
interlinked or interdependent (van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003). The resulting dynamics can be 
complex (irregular or even seemingly chaotic) and unpredictable (e.g., Noailly, 2003). 
Coevolution should be clearly differentiated from co-dynamics, which is, the interaction (e.g. 
negative and positive feedback) between subsystems in a larger system (van den Bergh and Stagl, 
2003; Winder et al., 2005). 
Attempts to elaborate the notion of coevolution in an environmental policy setting are 
Rammel and van den Bergh (2003), Rammel et al. (2004) and Bleischwitz (2003). A 
coevolutionary view is important for thinking about transitions and governance for two important 
reasons (Kemp et al., 2005). First, it accepts that we have cause-effect-cause loops across 
different scales and systems, with effects becoming causes of other developments. For example, 
people’s needs are partly endogenous to other developments (e.g., in transport and 
information/communication technology). This creates irreversibilities. Second, a coevolutionary 
perspective sees developments in different subsystems as partially independent (relative 
autonomy). This means that transitions cannot be managed from the top. Transitions typically 
evolve, with a limited role for comprehensive control. Finally, group selection may be relevant to 
the understanding of transitions, as it can explain group specific norms and group formation and 
conflict. According to group selection theory, selection is a multilevel process, occurring both 
within and among groups. The outcome of this depends on the relative force of each selection 
mechanism. If group selection effects are sufficiently strong, then groups are adaptive. This 
theory is used to explain altruism, cooperation, public goods and norms in groups of sizes beyond 
which kin selection and (direct or indirect) reciprocal selection can work. Although traditionally 
strongly debated in biology, the possibility of group selection is now supported by a range of 
theoretical models (Bergstrom, 2002). The empirical relevance of the theory differs amongst 
species, while its relevance for humans has recently been convincingly argued for (Wilson, 2002). 
A distinction can be made between genetic and cultural group selection, representing different 
transmission mechanisms that are operative, and which have distinct features and speeds (see a 
special issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization vol. 53(1), 2004). For 
example, in cultural group selection, higher institutions such as religions and prolonged education 
systems may influence the basic norms of individuals (notably children). In addition, non-random 
assorting (joining or forming groups based on similar individual characteristics or convictions) is 
more common in human social-economic systems. Group size, formation and stability are critical 
issues when examining group selection. They may provide useful policy linkages when applying 
the theory, in the context of transitions, to cooperation, group competition and stakeholder 
groups. 
 
Institutional economics 
Institutional economics is concerned with the identification of the various institutional 
mechanisms that coordinate economic activity, with ‘getting into grips’ with the circumstances 
under which these various mechanisms emerge, and with the logic inherent in the different 
coordination mechanisms (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Institutional economics developed as 
a separate branch of economic theory. Within it, a common distinction is made between old 
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(Veblen, Mitchell, Commons) and new streams (Myrdal, North, Olson, Williamson) (see 
Hodgson, 1988). 
 Mainstream economics has generally regarded institutions as constraints that can be 
altered by purposeful policy and regulation. In other words, institutional change is commonly 
framed as a control problem rather than an endogenous phenomenon. An exception to this general 
rule is found in the Coase theorem which states that in the presence of negative externalities, 
spontaneous negotiations among rational agents can lead to socially optimal outcomes. Applied 
institutional economic analysis has focused on the liberalization and the removal of imperfect 
competition in markets (anti-cartel legislation). In addition, the creation of well-functioning new 
markets has received some attention, most notably in the context of environmental policy 
(tradable permits) and semi-public goods (telecom auctions). 
The two approaches in institutional economics differ in terms of their theories of change: for 
‘new’ institutional economists, the pursuit of economic efficiency (through competition and 
political struggle) causes institutions to change. North (1981, 1991) has interpreted long periods 
of change in these terms. The other approach (i.e., ‘old’ institutional economists) is less economic 
in its identification of mechanisms. It emphasizes the historical nature of change, the role of 
contingency and the non-universalistic element in micro-change. Besides markets the following 
modes of governance (forms of interaction and mechanisms for compliance) are distinguished: 
communities, networks, associations, private hierarchies and the state. The modes differ in terms 
of organizational structure, rules of exchange and (individual and collective) means of 
compliance. Networks are based more on personal relationships and trust built outside of the 
economic arena. Private hierarchies and the state are structures that are more hierarchical 
structures, based on coercion and prescriptive rules (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997, p. 15-16). 
Institutions shape but do not determine behaviour. Historical change is both the result and 
determinant of institutional change (duality of structure).  
Institutional economics is concerned with transaction costs and trust (social capital) which are 
seen as important variables for explaining the link between micromotives and macro-behaviour – 
being an important transition topic. Institutional analysis is applied to organizations, economic 
sectors, values chains, and nations - all of which are relevant to transition research.  
 
(Neo-)Austrian economics 
The school of (Neo-) Austrian economics emphasizes the roundabout, multi-stage nature of 
production, temporal aspects of production, production processes as compositions of discrete 
techniques, and market processes instead of equilibrium. Both (Neo-)Austrian economics and  
evolutionary economics support a type of Schumpeterian competition of a different production 
process: an old technique is threatened and slowly replaced by a newer, more advanced, and 
usually more roundabout technique (i.e. involving more indirect or intermediate production 
connections). Such a multi-stage and multi-activity approach clearly fits within the study of 
transitions. 
Faber and Proops (1990) propose a neo-Austrian approach with evolutionary elements, to 
emphasize the role of time. They allow for irreversibility of changes in the sector structure of the 
economy, for uncertainty and novelty, and for a teleological sequence of production activities 
(“roundaboutness”). The long-term relation between environment, technology and development is 
characterized by the following three elements: 
• The use of non-renewable natural resources is irreversible in time, therefore a technology 
based on its use must ultimately cease to be viable. 
• Inventions and subsequent innovations lead to more efficient use of currently used resources 
and substitution by resources not used previously. 
• Innovation requires a certain stock of capital goods with certain characteristics is built up. 
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Faber and Proops construct a multi-sector model with the production side formulated in terms 
of activity analysis, which allows for the study of the effect of invention and innovation in 
moving from a situation with simple production activities to more complex or roundabout 
production activities. Roundabout activities use multiple technologies. For example, food 
production has become more roundabout, moving from agriculture with labour, through 
agriculture with labour and capital, to a large food processing industry with many intermediate 
deliveries. This approach is extended with the technology effects of resource scarcity as indicated 
above. It can then simulate economic and environmental history from a pre-industrial agricultural 
society to an industrial society using fossil fuels and capital. It allows for a combination of 
continuous changes in technological efficiency and discrete jumps in the number of sectors and 
interdependencies among sectors. With its original multi-stage perspective – an alternative to 
neoclassical economics – on structural economic change, neo-Austrian economics could provide 
a useful contribution to transition research. 
Some other methodological approaches, notably macroeconomic growth theory, will be 
addressed in the next section. 
 
3.2 Sub-disciplines 
Business cycles and long waves 
The phenomenon of long waves is relevant in the context of transition research. Long waves can 
be defined as cycles of prices, wages, outputs of specific basic commodities (e.g. energy 
resources, metals), foreign trade, interest rates, and various other economic variables. The notion 
of waves or cycles suggests an upward and downward swing, rise and decline (boom and 
depression). 
 Various types of cycles or waves have been identified (cf. Freeman, 1996) including the 
Kitchin cycle (40 months) related to keeping inventories; the Juglar or business cycle (7-11 years)  
related to adjustment of investment in fixed assets responding with delays to price changes; the 
Kuznets cycle (15-30 years) related to waves of migration and weather (exogenous ‘'luni-solar 
tides’ affecting rainfall and, in turn, crop production); and, the Kondratieff cycle (40-60 years). 
The Kondratiev growth cycle is perhaps the most interesting from a transition point of view 
because it is based on clusters of innovations. 
Many different opinions have been expressed regarding the nature of long Kondratiev 
waves as well as their causes (Freeman, 1996). They are often regarded as being caused by major 
shifts in technology, also known as the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm, which 
are followed by the diffusion of pervasive technologies among many sectors. Good examples are 
electricity and ICT. Freeman points out that the issue of long waves is contentious even among 
those who recognize fluctuations in economic variables over time. A deep methodological 
problem arises from the combination of the complexity of long-term history and the difficulty of 
empirically assessing the precise causality behind the long-wave phenomena. Reconstruction of 
historical data and statistical ‘de-trending’ (cliometrics) magnify these problems. Nevertheless, 
there is much to learn for transition researchers.  
Freeman and Perez (1998) identify five techno-economic transitions or Kondratieff 
waves: (1) early mechanisation, (2) steam power and railway, (3) electrical and heavy 
engineering, (4) Fordist mass production, and (5) information and communication technology. 
For each of the paradigms they identified the main carrier branches and induced growth sectors, 
the key factor industries offering abundant supply at decreasing prices, the sectors growing 
quickly from a small basis, the limitations provided by previous techno-economic paradigms, the 
ways in which the new paradigm provides solutions to certain problems, and finally the 
organization of firms and types of cooperation and competition. Similar to Rostow, Freeman and 
Perez speak of a “period of transition” to denote the deep structural change in the economy 
requiring an equally profound transformation of the institutional and social framework (Freeman 
and Perez, 1988, p. 59).  
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Development economics  
Development economics is concerned with barriers to and conditions for transitions from 
informal economies dominated by subsistence agriculture and local autarky to formal market 
economies involving market exchange, international trade and industrial activity. As a result, this 
field has many insights to offer on transitions, which would require a separate paper in itself to 
summarize. An important model is the one already discussed in the previous section by Rostow. 
Two other important ideas from development economics are backward linkages (Hirschman, 
1958) and cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957), topics which are being revisited by innovation 
economists in models of endogenous growth. Countries may get stuck in a low-growth 
equilibrium due to specialization in low-productivity techniques and sectors that generate few 
knowledge spillovers. Processes of catching up and falling behind have been studied by 
Fagerberg (1994) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) in models of technological gaps where a 
gap that is too large inhibits the process of catching up. Dynamic processes associated with the 
way in which an equilibrium gets established have also been analyzed in expectation-based 
models where the relative importance of the past and the expected future is shown to depend on 
parameters like the discount rate and the speed of adjustment (Pardham, 1995).  
 The “history versus expectation” controversy is not resolved (Krugman, 1991). It is 
generally agreed that any type of coordination for higher growth is not an easy task. The role of 
government is being reassessed within the field of development economics: government policy is 
increasingly viewed as holding back development rather than promoting it, due to government 
failures. The role of the government escaping development traps continues to be debated. 
Whatever the government’s role is, it is not simple, in part because development involves 
structural change and newly created capabilities that are difficult to manage. The use of foreign 
technology is not a real solution because of “tacitness and circumstantial sensitivity” of 
technology (Pardham, 1995). One lesson taken from development economics is that development 
defies precise control. Another is that it is difficult to manage adjustment processes, the interplay 
between macro-economic variables, and microeconomic processes. From development 
economics, transition research may borrow from the method of comparative analysis (of 
institutional arrangements such as good governance) and models of low-equilibrium traps (see 
Hayami, 1998). 
 There are several other relevant ideas within development economics. The Kuznets 
curve, an inverted U-shaped relationship between income per capita (horizontal axis) and income 
inequality (measured by, e.g., a Gini coefficient) formalizes that agricultural economies have a 
low level of income inequality, during early industrialization income inequality increases, while  
beyond a turning point inequality decreases (Kuznets, 1955). In an analogous manner, the notion 
of an environmental Kuznets curve (environmental pressure versus income per capita) has been 
examined, but has been shown to provide a less general result (de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999). 
Kuznets was also one of the first to suggest that the current developing countries were very 
different from what the western countries were before the time of industrialization. In other 
words, he stresses that the ‘linear model’ according to which all countries go through the same 
stages, is incorrect. Kuznets (1971) argued that various conditions are needed for development. 
Advancing technology is necessary but insufficient. Institutional and attitudinal adjustment – 
which might be called ‘social innovation’ – are also required. A number of changes characterize 
the development process: increases in average per capita income, total factor productivity and 
international trade and relations and, structural transformation of the economy, as well as social 
and ideological transformations. 
 There are many other concepts, proposals and models in development economics that are 
potentially relevant to transition research: structural change models (e.g., Lewis’ 2-sector model 
of food production and manufacturing), international-dependence models (neocolonialism), false-
paradigm model (not accounting for unique cultural, tribal, caste and institutional circumstances), 
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dualistic-development thesis (combination of modern and traditional approaches; of wealthy, 
educated elites and masses of illiterate, poor people; and of monetized markets and informal 
barter trade), coordination failures (market failures, lack of complementary and intermediate 
sectors, lack of specialized labour – e.g., O-ring theory), differing initial conditions (physical 
resources, human resources, climate, population size), neoclassical economics perspectives on 
market liberalization and internationalization, analysis of a range of other factors (demography, 
quality-quantity trade-off with regard to offspring, migration, foreign aid). See, for instance, 
Todaro and Smith (2003) for an introduction to these various ideas. It is therefore likely that most 
of the ideas currently generated by transition researchers are reinventions of older ideas by 
previous researchers of economic development. 
 
Economic growth theory 
Within neoclassical economics, the theory of economic growth offers the most clear and strong 
link with  transitions.  This theory includes a variety of approaches. One can distinguish between 
classical (Smith to Marx), Keynesian (Harrod-Domar, Meade), neoclassical (exogenous; Solow-
Swan), endogenous growth theory (Romer, Lucas), and others (e.g., von Neumann). In addition, 
it is possible to identify positive and normative theories (Tinbergen, Cass-Koopmans, Ramsey, 
golden rules, turnpike), and multisectoral approaches (Uzawa). Policy relevant issues relate to 
convergence of growth rates and levels among countries, avoidance or undoing of poverty traps. 
 Transitions are characterized by non-linear developments. Transitions have periods when 
development is slow and at other times, fast.  In theoretical dynamic models of growth theory, 
these features of a transition are recognized without having to specify micro-processes. In fact, 
‘transition’ is used sometimes to denote the shift to a higher equilibrium growth path. In 
normative growth theory, transitions are associated with the ‘turnpike’ theorem. This theorem 
states that it can be optimal from an intertemporal welfare perspective to follow a (close to) 
maximally rapid growth path to allow an economy to move to a more satisfactory state quickly, 
despite consumption being lower during the transition than at the beginning or end of the period 
(Dorfman et al., 1958). 
Stability is another aspect of growth theory. The neoclassical growth (Solow-Swan) 
approach ignores macroeconomic stability as it is assumed that planned investment always equals 
planned savings, and that the capital-output ratio can change through investment. The 
macroeconomic adjustment process that makes this true is omitted. The Harrod-Domar approach 
has a fixed capital/output ratio and generally no equality of savings and investment, and results in 
unstable steady-state growth. Essential for growth and development in the Harrod-Domar 
framework, is the proportion of income saved (not consumed), which will steer capital investment 
- the engine of growth. 
A central concept in neoclassical growth theory is convergence. The Solow model 
(Solow, 1956) has provided the basis for examining convergence. Absolute convergence means 
that different countries with the same population growth rate, the same savings propensity, access 
to the same technology but different capital-labor ratios, will converge to the same growth rate, 
steady-state capital-labour ratio, output per capita, and consumption per capita. Conditional 
convergence means that countries which differ in savings propensities and capital-labour ratio, 
will converge to the same growth rate but not necessarily to the same capital-labour ratio and 
output per capita. The lack of convergence has been explained theoretically by invoking notions 
of technological and population induced poverty traps (a vicious circle of low savings and few 
investment opportunities). In this sense the (Malthusian) demographic transition is also relevant: 
as income per capita rises, the population growth rate rises. 
Exogenous growth theory does not explain empirical facts of growth well. In particular, 
about half of historical growth could not be attributed to investments in production factors. This 
so-called ‘Solow residual’ was one reason to develop endogenous growth theory (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). An essential assumption here is that private and public 
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investments are associated with positive externalities (spill-overs) that undo tendencies of 
diminishing marginal returns on capital investment. Complementary investments in human 
capital (knowledge, innovation) and an optimal trade-off between human and physical capital 
investments are critical for this area of research. 
Finally, two-sector models (with consumption and capital production sectors and 
intermediate deliveries) have received little and/or ad hoc attention. This is unfortunate, as they 
seem to be crucially related to transitions, in particular to understand structural changes in sector 
composition and interrelations. Endogenous growth theory has generated some two-sector 
models, but these are only meant to address the production and costs of innovations in a separate 
‘knowledge sector’. An original model is one in which the neoclassical rational agents and 
equilibrium are combined with vertical innovation or (Schumpeterian) creative destruction 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992). All in all, the results of the enormous body of growth theory are a bit 
disappointing where transition research is concerned. 
 
Economic history 
We indicated in Section 1 that transition research would benefit from the study of historical 
transitions. This immediately supports the potentially useful role that economic history can play. 
In this field, all types of variables are interwoven into narratives (traditional approach) or 
combined in formal models (cliometrics). Economic history is much more data-driven than 
theory-driven. Theory is nevertheless implicit in the choice of explanatory variables and in the 
importance attached to certain variables and events. Mokyr (1990) has identified a long list of 
factors that he regards as crucial for successful technological innovations in economic history. 
Table 1 present a selection of the most important ones, which van den Heuvel and van den Bergh 
(2005) have divided into basic and side conditions. Although such a classification is helpful, it 
should be realized that the factors are not always independent. Factors may be strongly dependent 
on others in a certain region and during a specific time period. In any case, transition studies 
might systematically examine the state and role of these various factors. 
 
Table 1. Fundamental innovation factors 
Basic conditions Side conditions 
Level of nutrition  Geographical environment  
Life expectancy Demographic factors 
Norms and values  Institutions, property rights, and regulation  
Openness to information Resistance to innovation (conservatism) 
Willingness to bear risks Science and technology 
Religion  
War  
Note: Factors based on Mokyr (1990); own classification in two types. 
Source: van den Heuvel and van den Bergh (2005). 
 
 Cliometrics, with its focus on quantitative analysis, might also be useful for 
understanding transitions.  This type of study involves the application of economic theory and 
econometric-statistical techniques to understand regularities of economic history. Both Greif 
(1997) and North (1997) emphasize that this has advantages over narratives, even though a main 
limitation of the approach in the past has been associated with a strong reliance on foundations in 
neoclassical economics. North, however, is optimistic about using cliometrics to include such 
aspects as bounded rationality, transactions costs and changing preferences. In addition, a main 
problem to be resolved is associated with the linking of independent but often abundant data on 
economic, demographic, educational, institutional and technological variables. There is much to 
learn from past cliometric research, as major transitions have already received ample attention.  
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A famous example of this research includes  Fogel’s (1964) study of the transition from 
horse wagon to rail in the U.S.A.. Fogel argued that the common belief that railroads played an 
important role in overall American economic development at the end of the 19th century is 
overestimated. He suggested that the innovation of the railroad delayed the emergence of modern 
cars and trucks with combustion engines, for decades. In addition Fogel adopts a type of spatial 
economic perspective in assessing the impact of different (hypothetical) transport technologies 
based on spatial economic patterns. 
 An institutional-historical approach towards transitions is promoted by North (1981) in 
the analysis of the transition from primitive agriculture to modern intensive agriculture. North 
regards the move from common property (or better: open access) to exclusive property rights as 
the critical factor in the first economic revolution, because it allowed cumulative technological 
improvements that set the stage for a lasting period of high growth. Institutions may be composed 
of both formal (laws) and informal (social norms) rules of the game within a society (North, 
1991). Modern economies require property rights, and effective, impersonal contract 
enforcement. Societies are less likely to develop and flourish when constraining formal or 
informal institutions limit the range of economic combinations possible. Unlike Rostow, North 
did not develop an economic model of a transition but focused on the role of political and 
economic institutions in reducing uncertainty and transaction costs in order to realize potential 
gains from exchange. 
 Another interesting historical study is provided by Wilkinson (1973), who developed an 
ecological explanation which linked the Industrial Revolution to natural resource factors (see also 
Common 1988). It recognizes a number of human strategies that respond to resource scarcity, 
such as new techniques, new resources, new goods, and migration. According to Wilkinson, the 
use of coal was stimulated by high prices of wood, following the significant loss of forest cover in 
England. In the early phase, coal was mined at strips at the surface. Later deep mines were 
explored. This in turn created an ‘important’ problem: the need to pump away groundwater, 
which gave rise to the first large scale, application of the steam engine. Widespread use of it gave 
rise to various refinements of the steam engine, alternative models and as such, new types of 
applications. In a next phase, spin-offs to other sectors occurred, especially to the textile industry 
and to transport’s ships and trains powered by steam locomotives. Wilkinson´s work helped to 
reconfirm the importance of resource scarcity for human development and advanced a cause-
effect view which is very relevant to transition processes. The earlier model by Faber and Proops 
(in the previous section) can be regarded as a crude formalization of Wilkinson’s conceptual 
model. 
 
Economic studies of transition economies 
Since the 1990s much attention has been given to the transition from communism to market-
democracy systems. This research was motivated by fundamental changes in the former USSR 
and east-European countries which have been taking place since the second half of the 1980s. 
Studies give specific attention to emerging markets (competition), institutions (property rights), 
transformation of public to private production, role of trust and independent media, 
entrepreneurship and investment, trade and foreign involvement. Economics of transition is now a 
well-developed field. In this field, there is unanimous agreement that institutions matter and that 
each country’s evolution is unique.  
There has been a fundamental debate between big bang and gradualist advocates, even 
though the knowledge basis is very thin. Economists have certainly underestimated the 
coordination problems of moving toward market-based systems (Gros and Steinherr, 2004). All 
European transition economies experienced a fall in output, for much longer times and more deep 
than originally anticipated. It required new models to explain this, with positive non-linear 
feedback (e.g., Rosser and Rosser, 2004). Countries that implemented reforms early on into the 
process usually were ahead of the others (Gros and Steinherr, 2004, p. 110). Reforms consisted of 
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price liberalization, privatization of property, liberalization of trade through removal of tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions, currency reforms, and macro-economic stabilization policies (to reduce 
inflation). Command-economy characteristics did, however, not disappear immediately or 
completely (path-dependency).  
 Within this genre of literature ‘transition curves’ are being estimated (Philips and Sul, 
2005). Political economy aspects are investigated to explain differences in economic performance 
among transition economies in relation to the sequence of reforms (Roland, 2002; Kornai, 2005). 
The transition experience very much reinforced the institutional perspective in economics. It also 
stimulated people “to think about institutions not in a static way but in a dynamic way: how 
momentum for reform is created and how institutions can evolve, but also how momentum can be 
lost and how one can get stuck in inefficient institutions” (Roland, 2002, p. 47). The mainstream 
economics influence here is that governments should just improve the conditions under which 
decentralized decisions are made, i.e., let markets find the route towards the future (Hayek, 1978). 
All in all, much can be learned from this field for transition research. 
 
Economics of technology  
It is evident that the economics of innovation and technology address a number of issues that are 
relevant to transition research. This field is concerned with incentives and institutional 
mechanisms of knowledge creation and spillovers. Schumpeter is considered to be the founder of 
this field, at least where the definition of the issues is concerned. Ever since Schmookler (1966) 
innovation is seen as being responsive to economic stimuli with search processes being informed 
by engineering ideas that indicate what is worthwhile (‘notional opportunities’). Later research on 
technological regimes found that innovation is not fully responsive to economic stimuli and 
occurs within certain patterns and constraints (Dosi, 1988; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997). 
Innovation is found to be different across sectors and to be surprisingly similar across countries. 
This has to do with technological opportunities, appropriability conditions, degrees of 
cumulativeness of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge (generic versus specific, tacit versus 
codified, complex versus simple), as shown by Malerba and Orsenigo (1997). 
 Innovation is a very broad term, comprised of technological innovations, product 
innovations, and changes in markets, organisation, logistics and finance. Freeman and Perez 
(1988) make a distinction between incremental innovations, radical innovations, changes of 
technology system and pervasive changes in a nation’s technological basis (changes in techno-
economic paradigm). Rosenberg talks about minor and major innovations where major 
innovations are those that provide a framework for a large number of subsequent innovations. For 
transition research, an important distinction is between sustaining innovations and disrupting 
innovations (Christensen, 1997). Disrupting innovations are those innovations that render 
obsolete existing structures and systems (e.g. automobiles and minicomputers). These innovations 
often come from outsiders who are serving non-mainstream customers. Disruptive products tend 
to under-perform in mainstream markets but have certain features that are highly valued by 
specific customers (i.e., military and other idiosyncratic costumers for who performance is more 
important than price). As a product improves, it might then break out of its original, small niche 
and replace the dominant product, as happened in the case of gas turbines and more recently in 
the case of digital cameras. 
A transition model of technology evolution is the lifecycle model of Abernathy and Utterback 
(1978). The transition is the shift of product innovation, to process and unit production, to mass 
production, following the establishment of a dominant design. This model applies to high-volume 
products and does not apply to all goods. In services there may be a reverse lifecycle (Barras, 
1986), with product innovation succeeding process innovations (automation). The lifecycle model 
has been extended into an evolutionary model of variation, selection and retention by Tushman 
and Rosenkopf (1992). They distinguish two phases: an era of ferment (a time of competing 
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designs and organizations around them), and an era of incremental change. During all stages there 
is variation, selection and retention. 
 The economics of innovation is a broad field drawing on information and behavioural 
economics (learning, bounded rationality), organizational theories and system theory. Attention is 
given to wider issues besides the economic stimuli, that are shaping technical change. The notion 
of a national system of innovation model is an effort to understand the whole of factors shaping 
processes of knowledge creation and dissemination. Special attention is paid to institutions of 
science and education, to firm capabilities and to cultural issues. Companies are seen as 
embedded in innovation systems (or regimes) that guide, aid and constrain the innovation. The 
task for policy is not so much to create more competition but to set in motion processes of 
cumulative causation (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). To do so, policy should strengthen 
inducement mechanisms and deal with blocking mechanisms. Many blocking mechanisms exist.  
Attention is given to the dominance of existing systems that have benefited from learning 
processes and processes of adjustment and integration (Freeman and Perez, 1988, Kemp and 
Soete, 1992, Freeman and Louca, 2001). 
 A formal analysis of technological succession is being offered by Windrum and 
Birchenhall (2005). Increasing returns to scale are found to play an important role in successions, 
fitting in with empirical findings (for example of Klepper, 1996) that high start up costs are an 
important factor deterring new market entrants. A succession, a specific kind of transition, is 
found to be more than the displacement of old technology products by new technology products. 
It also involves the displacement of existing customer classes and preferences, the displacement 
of established market firms and established structures of production.  
 
Environmental, resource and ecological economics 
A transition to sustainable development cannot occur without good environmental regulation and 
resource management. The field of economics dealing with this is environmental (and resource) 
economics. Environmental economics addresses the economic analysis of the causes and the 
nature of environmental problems and their solutions. This includes issues relating to markets as 
well as to public policy. Environmental economics covers resource economics. The combination 
makes sense, since many resource issues are intricately linked to environmental issues. This is 
perhaps most noticeable in the case of fossil energy resources, the use of which contributes to the 
enhanced greenhouse effect. The notion of sustainable development, which has become one of 
the pillars of modern environmental economics, supports the linkage of resource and 
environmental problems. Closely related to environmental economics is ecological economics. It 
can be regarded as a social-science oriented version of environmental science. It has perhaps been 
most successful in promoting multidisciplinary research in which natural scientists (notably 
ecologists) and social scientists (notably economists) join forces. 
The economic theory of environmental policy starts from the concept of “externalities” 
(see also the item “public economics”). Environmental economics is particularly interested in 
negative environmental externalities, i.e. negative physical effects of environmental pollution, 
resource use, or other types of environmental disturbance, such as fragmentation due to road 
infrastructure in nature areas, by one agent to another. Externalities have been analytically 
examined and discussed with the help of partial and general equilibrium theories, which is 
consistent with neoclassical assumptions regarding individual behaviour and operation of 
markets. 
Instruments of environmental policy are traditionally evaluated in economics on the basis 
of their efficiency features. Effectiveness and distribution effects (equity, fairness) function as 
secondary evaluation criteria. The most common (archetypal) comparison is between uniform 
standards and taxes of pollution control. Taxes are attractive as they provide better incentives 
than standards to change individuals’ behaviour, and thus realize more efficient outcomes: either 
social welfare is higher or costs of realizing fixed targets are lower. This is accomplished by 
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equalising marginal costs of pollution abatement, assuming that individual polluters are 
minimizing costs. Standards are especially attractive from the perspective of effectiveness (or 
uncertainty). A combined instrument is a system of tradable permits. This has two features - a 
ceiling is set on all pollution emissions of a particular type by granting a finite amount of 
emission permits and, permits are tradable. The first feature assures effectiveness, and the second 
efficiency. Taxes and tradable permits are dynamically efficient, as they provide a permanent 
incentive for cost-savings through innovations. 
Environmental economists support transition research by studying the irreversibility of 
changes resulting from policy and/or a lack of policy.  This has been addressed with option value 
theory (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). Decisions made in private markets do not lead to socially 
desirable use, allocation, transformation and conservation of nature and (scarce) land. This 
literature suggests that under certain conditions irreversible developments should be avoided or 
postponed until better information can be obtained. See Gollier et al. (2000) for linking this 
literature to the precautionary principle, and Pindyck (2000) for examining the notion of optimal 
timing for implementation of environmental policy. 
An important and somewhat related idea, receiving much attention in ecological 
economics,  is ‘resilience’, an extended stability concept. It has two definitions: (i) the time 
necessary for a disturbed system to return to its original state (Pimm, 1984); and (ii) the amount 
of disturbance that a system can absorb before moving to another state (Holling, 1973, 1986). 
Unlike most growth economists, whose models provide no upper bound on economic growth, 
physical scientists and ecologists are accustomed to the idea of limits. Ecologists are far less 
optimistic about substitution possibilities (of man-made capital for natural capital) than 
neoclassical economists, which is evident in the Holling view of sustainability which is really 
about maintaining ecosystem resilience. Diversity is important for resilience and for evolution. 
Some authors have tried to find analogies of resilience in socio-economic systems. Static 
efficiency achieved through standardisation or tight control may reduce resilience (adaptivity) 
through reduced diversity. (see Levin et al. 1998; Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Policy 
implications are very different from those of standard economics: diversity is to be positively 
valued, one should be careful not to overexploit, and one should not exceed critical thresholds 
leading the system into collapse. This provides a bridge to evolutionary approaches which might 
shed light on the particular micro-level mechanisms involved in bifurcation and resilience 
(Rammel and van den Bergh, 2003). 
Other ideas in ecological economics with relevance to transition research are coevolution 
and endogenous preferences, both having close connections to evolutionary thinking. Norgaard 
(1984) was the first to consider the application of the concept of coevolution to the interaction 
between economic and natural systems. His main illustration is the coevolution of pests, pesticide 
and environmental policy in the U.S.A. (e.g., Norgaard, 1994). Nevertheless, his ideas have been 
criticized for not indicating a sharp distinction between the interaction among subsystems (“co-
dynamics”) and strict coevolution as interacting populations with internal diversity causing 
mutual selection pressure (Winder et al., 2005). 
The idea that preferences are endogenous instead of invariant has led Norton et al. (1998) 
to argue that changing consumer preferences can be in and of itself, an instrument of 
environmental policy. In particular they state that stable preferences are at best realistic over short 
periods of time, and that sovereign preferences are inconsistent with long term goals of 
sustainability. Consequently, public discussion about ethical consumption and sustainability 
should be stimulated via education, advertising rules, cultural norms, etc. Changing consumers’ 
preferences through democratic processes could be used to encourage environmentally conscious 
consumption in a way that consumers would not feel “... deprived and unhappy ...” but “... 
enlightened and happy after being educated into the joys …”(Norton et al., 1998, p203). Most 
democratically elected governments have already formulated public policies aimed at influencing 
norms which are regarded as criminal, racist or otherwise undemocratic, so why not extend this 
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practice towards environmental sustainability? A demand side perspective is a useful addition to 
the dominance of innovation and R&D supply-side oriented policies, necessary to realize 
complex transitions. 
 
Industrial economics 
It is important to understand the behaviour of firms, their responses to incentives and regulation, 
and the interaction between firms in markets when trying to stimulate transition processes. 
Industrial economics offers relevant insights, being an extension of the theory of the firm to 
address a number of firm-internal and firm-external issues in a theoretical manner (e.g., Martin, 
2001). This includes attention to market type (monopoly, oligopoly, etc.), vertical integration, 
price strategies (multi-product pricing, intertemporal price discrimination), product 
differentiation, price-quality trade-off and advertising, strategic behaviour and interaction 
between firms, the role of capacity constraints and investment strategies, rent seeking, 
complementary and networks, and asymmetric information affecting management and 
competition. For transition research especially long term issues like long-run, sunk and 
transactions costs, long (vs short) run price competition, barriers to entry and entry deterrence, 
exit, market contestability (threat of competition for incumbent firms by potential entrants), and 
R&D strategies are relevant when conducting transitions research. The policy angle within 
industrial economics focuses on antitrust legislation and other regulation to overcome various 
market failures related to imperfect markets (notably, collusion), incomplete and asymmetric 
information, standards and lock-in, and innovation externalities (patents, subsidies). A more 
empirical and statistical branch addresses the demography of industries (Carroll and Hannan, 
2000). 
 
Path-dependence and lock-in 
A specific concept on the boundary of economics of technology, evolutionary economics and 
industrial economics, is path-dependence. This concept is highly relevant for transition research, 
as one can regard the essence of the transition problem to be the un-locking of a locked-in socio-
economic-technological-institutional system. Path-dependence is intricately linked to lock-in. 
Moreover, lock-in has been one reason, additional to already recognized ‘market failures’, for 
believing that markets do not generally lead to (socially) efficient, or otherwise desirable, 
outcomes. Whilst markets encourage efficiency in production, the long-term outcomes may not 
be the most efficient when demand and supply are characterised by increasing returns. Regulation 
of environmental externalities may not have the intended effect of moving to an alternative 
technology or product associated with less environmental pressure. A technology that has 
achieved an early advantage may dominate or capture the market due to increasing returns to 
scale, according to a kind of self-reinforcement process, i.e., a larger market or market share 
stimulates relatively high growth. Increasing returns to scale take a number of forms: 
• (Traditional) scale economies: cost and price decrease as the scale of production increases. 
• Learning by using or doing: improvement, lower costs (producer), better performance 
(consumer). 
• Imitation or bandwagon effect: rather than innovate, companies may imitate the most 
successful product, and the popularity of a certain good may propagate (as with fads). 
• Agglomeration effects: spatial spillovers, easy communication and short transport distances 
that give rise to positive externalities. 
• Network externalities: being connected to a larger network (e.g. via phone) often has an 
advantage. 
• Financial power: the more a product or technology is adopted, the more resources will be 
available for its development and perfection, which, in turn, will make it relatively attractive 
for potential adopters. 
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• Informational increasing returns: if a product is adopted more, and therefore becomes better 
known, then risk-averse individuals will more easily be convinced to buy it. 
• Technological inter-relatedness or complementarity: infrastructure and sub-technologies are 
often complementary (gasoline, refineries, filling stations, car technology). This relates to the 
importance of coevolution of complementary factors (knowledge, technology and 
institutions). 
• New knowledge is shared by firms: firms increase knowledge due to learning-by-doing and 
innovation, which can be shared with other firms in the same sector with similar problems. 
This leads to dynamic increasing returns at the level of industries. 
• The political power of vested interests, operating, among others, through lobbying in politics. 
 
Due to these mechanisms, formally studied by Arthur (1988, 1990), a technology with a large 
market share, due to an early start, has an advantage and as such can grow relatively quickly 
(attain an even larger market share), even without any intrinsic (cost or net welfare) advantages. 
An important consequence of increasing returns is that the (adoption) process towards the final or 
equilibrium state of the system is path-dependent (non-ergodic). Path-dependence can be 
interpreted as temporally remote events having a significant or dominant impact on the present: 
the logic of the world can be understood only by uncovering how it got this way (David, 1985). 
Path-dependence thus implies irreversibility. It should be noted, however, that path-dependence is 
not the consequence of purely random factors, but results from interaction between random and 
systematic or deterministic, notably selection, factors. Contingency interacts with historical 
selection forces, with the latter probably being more important. In the words of historian Landes: 
“big processes call for big causes”. This fits with the transition perspective of Rotmans and others 
who assert that mutually sustaining developments at different levels (niches, regimes and 
landscape) are necessary for a transition to occur. 
Path-dependence can result in lock-in. Lock-in occurs when a dynamic pattern of competing 
technologies ends up in a situation with one technology dominating the market. Heterogeneity of 
user needs and other types of heterogeneity (at the supply side or otherwise) usually mitigate 
against this but, in the case of large increasing returns, as with network technologies, there is a 
danger of becoming locked into particular solutions.  A situation of lock-in can persist for a very 
long time, as happened with the QWERTY typewriter (David, 1985) and the light-water nuclear 
reactor for electricity production (Cowan, 1990). It can be argued that the use of fossil fuels 
constitutes an example of lock-in. The latter is relevant to the transition to a sustainable economy 
and energy system. 
Apart from the economic sources of lock-in we have institutional and cultural path-
dependency, meaning that institutions or cultural habits are fixed and cannot be changed easily 
(Unruh, 2000, 2002; Kemp, 1994). Any transition requires new institutions and new forms of 
alignment, which take time and effort. They are not controlled from a central point but the result 
of distributed agency and entrepreneurship. In the establishment of a new path, a multitude of 
actors becomes involved with a technology and generates inputs that result in a transformation of 
an emerging technological path (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). In the early period when the 
technology is in a flux, social, organizational and political factors are important shapers of 
technical change, later on ‘technology’ becomes a determining factor, with technological 
imperatives setting the conditions for competition (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Molina, 
1999). In conclusion, it can be said that any new path creates new path-dependences. 
 
Public economics  
Public economics is the sub-discipline within economics that provides the most general 
perspective on public policy, in terms of the conditions under which public intervention is 
required as well as the form policy should take (institutional arrangement, policy instrument 
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type). Likewise, public economics can shed light on certain aspects of transition management, 
notably where these relate to solving public goods and externality type of problems. Pure public 
goods are characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability in use. However, many mixed type 
of private-public goods are found, namely where rivalry is not perfect due to congestion beyond a 
certain threshold, or where property rights take different forms (common, state, clubs). To make 
things more complicated, both rivalry and excludability may sometimes change due to technical 
progress (e.g., technical exclusion or inclusion, e.g., allowing the whole world to see a particular 
football match).  
 A number of public goods are relevant in the context of transitions. One is knowledge, 
which is a quasi-public good. It is non-rivalry in use but people can be excluded from it, through 
secrecy and patents. Much public investment in knowledge is undertaken most notably through 
universities and related institutes. Certain goods require physical infrastructure for their use. 
Historically government plays an important role in the provision of such infrastructure but it can 
also be provided through private capital if the costs of using it can be charged to the users (e.g.,  
toll roads). Public-private-partnerships offer a mechanism to transfer the risk and debt associated 
with these new capital projects to the private sector in return for a long-term service contract. 
Property rights typically remain with government. 
 Externalities are unintended and unpriced (outside markets) effects exerted by one 
economic agent onto another, affecting his/her utility or profit. Externalities come in both 
negative (e.g., environmental pollution) and positive forms (R&D or knowledge benefits). The 
fact that individuals make decisions without concern for externalities – by definition – means an 
outcome that is not consistent with the highest attainable level of social welfare. Regulation is 
therefore required. Negative externalities need to be suppressed (optimally with good taxes, levies 
or tradable permits) while positive externalities need to be responded to with subsidies or patents.  
Next to policy, self-regulation or evolution of social norms of common-pool resources 
can be an effective mechanism (Ostrom, 1990). This can occur through local interactions among 
users that involve monitoring and (altruistic) punishment. Externally or hierarchically imposed 
regulation can destabilize co-operation, notably when associated hierarchical monitoring is 
imperfect. Stimulating norms through communication may then be more desirable. Instability in 
the evolutionary equilibrium can also arise when certain parameter or external changes occur. 
Examples are: sanctions decline, harvesting becomes more efficient (technical progress), the 
resource price alters, resource users migrate, external economic and political events, and natural 
disasters influence the resource quality and processes. 
Finally, public choice theory clarifies how public decision making and policies are 
influenced by special interests through lobbying and negotiation. In addition, it recognizes that a 
government is not a homogeneous group or analogous to a single decision making individual, but 
is composed of various individuals or groups (civil servants and politicians) with possibly 
conflicting interests and goals (Dietz and Vollebergh, 1999). This is of relevance to transition 
research, where it is often stressed that important barriers to transitions are created by power and 
vested interests of specific stakeholder groups. 
 
Spatial economics 
Transitions involve heterogeneous spatial processes as well as complex spatial interactions. 
Spatial issues are studied within spatial economics, which is an amalgam of regional, urban and 
transport economics. Spatial economics cover issues that use the approach of neoclassical 
economics and approaches common to the study of technological innovation and spatial 
diffusion, to understand spatial economic regularities. Important insights of this field for 
transition research relate to the location of industries, urban and regional markets, spatial 
externalities (both negative and positive - innovation and agglomeration related), spatial patterns 
of diffusion, regional diversity, regional isolation, regional (open system) dynamics, and 
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economic effects of infrastructure. Recent development in new economic geography furthermore 
link up with international economics (Krugman, 1991). 
 One only needs to refer to the problems associated with non-point source (diffuse) 
pollution problems, land use and biodiversity loss, specific urban environmental problems (noise, 
health problems, congestion), and the impact of stringent environmental regulation on location 
choice, trade and transport (Siebert, 1985; van den Bergh, 1999, part V), to understand that the 
interaction between environmental policy and spatial economic analysis is relevant. 
 The interaction between technological innovation studies and spatial economic analysis 
has focused on regional development, spatial diffusion of innovations, and diversity and isolation 
of regional initiatives (Malecki, 1997; Acs, 2003). Insights about the functioning and boundaries 
of urban and regional markets – for products, services, housing, labour, and transport – may 
moreover be useful when searching for niches and diverse industrial trajectories. Agglomeration 
effects may be important as well, similar to the role played by positive externalities in 
endogenous growth theory. Fostering agglomeration means stimulating shared inputs (labour 
pool, knowledge) at relatively low costs. In addition, public infrastructure and capital may be 
crucial (i.e., roads, public transport, parking facilities, communication systems, and attractive 
nearby living conditions). An important question with regard to public investment in 
infrastructure is whether it stimulates new development and innovations or just leads to relocation 
of existing activities (Eberts and McMillen, 1999). 
From a policy perspective, a number of issues are relevant. Diffuse pollution might 
require input regulation rather than direct pollution regulation. The Tiebout hypothesis is relevant 
(Tiebout, 1956) with respect to local public goods.  This hypothesis points out a mechanism of 
self-organization at a higher spatial level by suggesting that local public goods may differ and in 
turn cause migration (‘voting with the feet’). Implementing land use taxes will affect the cost of 
using land, which in turn will influence location choices by firms and households. Henry George 
suggested already in the 19th century to tax the rental value of land. This will generate revenue 
that benefits the community instead of the individual private landowner. Very often the price of 
land is high simply because of positive externalities generated in the surrounding area by 
attractive places and services (Cohen and Coughlin, 2005). Likely consequences of a single 
(Georgian) or two-rate land tax are an improved quality of land and buildings, shorter transport 
distances, and less urban pollution. Such land taxes can possibly contribute to a transition to 
sustainability. 
 
4. A summary of contributions from economics  
Given the broad scope of this article it is impossible to provide a complete overview. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to try to identify the most exciting theories and concepts that 
economics has to offer for transition research. Table 2 outlines the results of our efforts. Its point 
of entry indicates the type of problems that one typically experiences while studying transitions, 
whether reflecting into the past (history) or visually the way ahead (future). The table summarizes 
the main approaches and concepts by identifying a list of core transition challenges in the first 
column, and then relating these to economic approaches. Relevant concepts of these approaches 
are listed and where necessary, comments are provided to indicate if there is a requirement to 
elaborate further on the approach or concept(s) as they relate to the respective transition 
challenge. The table is not perfect as it assumes a decomposition of transition challenges, which 
in reality are often connected and interactive. Similarly, sub-disciplines of economics are not 
entirely independent, but overlap in terms of problems studied, concepts used and solutions 
offered. That said, the table serves a useful function by providing guidelines for the reader 
interested in transitions research and the schools of economics that seek solutions to the problems 
specific to transitions. 
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Table 2. An overview of economic theories and concepts relevant to transition research 
Transition challenge Useful economic approaches Relevant concepts Need for 
elaboration 
Barriers Grand development theories, Economic 
history, Evolutionary economics, 
Ecological Economics 
Resilience, lock-in, learning by 
using or doing, imitation, network 
externalities, technological inter-
relatedness (complements), vested 
interest (rent-seeking) 
 
+ 
Supply side Economics of technology, Industrial 
economics, Grand development theories 
Market failures, scale economies, 
innovation strategies, cooperation, 
networks, complementary 
products, vertical integration, rent 
seeking, demography of industries 
 
0 
Transition dynamics Long waves, Economic history, 
Macroeconomics, Growth theory, neo-
Austrian economics, Development 
economics, Economics of disasters 
Increasing returns, life cycle,  
competition, multi-stages, shocks, 
disasters (natural, economic, war) 
 
++ 
Innovation tempo Economics of technology, Evolutionary 
economics, Economics of information 
Patents, subsidies, market niches, 
experiments, diffusion, adoption, 
innovation systems 
 
+ 
Demand side Marketing, Behavioural economics Habits, imitation, lexicographic 
preferences 
 
++ 
Externalities Public economics, Environmental 
economics 
Public goods, club goods, 
regulatory instruments, efficiency 
 
0 
Diversity Evolutionary economics, Economics of 
technology, Economics of information 
Short term efficiency, long term 
innovation, increasing returns, 
adaptation, flexibility, real options 
 
+++ 
Spatial organization Regional and urban economics Location, Tiebout hypothesis, 
agglomeration effects, transport, 
infrastructure, regional diversity, 
spatial isolation, trade 
 
++ 
Institutional conditions Institutional economics, Public 
economics, Economics of transition 
economies 
(Intellectual) property rights, 
education, science, legislation, 
markets, culture and behaviour 
(norms and values, risk attitude, 
conservatism, religion), regulation 
 
++ 
Knowledge Economics of information, 
(Endogenous) Growth theory 
Asymmetric information, learning, 
search, uncertainty, expectation, 
positive externalities, network 
formation, informational 
increasing returns 
 
+ 
Role of private firms Industrial economics, economics of 
information 
Competition, market failures, 
investment conditions, uncertainty 
 
0 
Role of government(s) Public economics, Environmental 
economics 
Government failures, market (self-
organization), public investment 
(infrastructure, R&D), removing 
uncertainty (insurance), conflict 
resolution 
 
++ 
Demography Population economics Education, labour force, 
productivity, risk attitude 
 
+ 
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5. Evaluating mainstream economics from a transition research perspective  
So far we have looked rather constructively at the theories, concepts and insights economics 
broadly offers a potential contribution transition research. It should be acknowledged, however, 
that some authors have emphasized that the dominance of mainstream or neoclassical economics 
provides a barrier to understanding and perhaps even fostering urgently required transitions, and 
that it conflicts with the ‘transition (management) paradigm’ (Rotmans, 2003). A problem in 
assessing the value of the latter statement is that this ‘paradigm’ has not yet crystallised out 
(RMNO, 2003). Indeed, it is still characterised by a diversity of opinions and a loose set of ideas 
without firm and consistent theory and associated formal models. In fact, this incomplete 
development of transition theory underlines the usefulness of examining what the contribution of 
economics might be to understanding and managing transitions. 
 The question therefore is this: how well suited is neoclassical economics for the study of 
long term transitions. A quick judgement might be that neoclassical economics is too concerned 
with economic variables, prices and income effects, and is missing out on the cultural, 
institutional and structural aspects of economic change. In defence of neoclassical economics, 
apart from what was already noted in section 3.1, we can say that especially general equilibrium 
models provide a complete structure of how prices and quantities of all the goods are linked 
together. A transition involves large changes, with effects that permeate the economy (among 
others) through price and cost structures. In this respect, the neoclassical economic approach 
provides a firm tool for calculating the impacts of structural change. Economists prefer to 
separate out only a few cultural and institutional aspects but this does not mean that they are not 
part of the equation: they are implicit in the demand and cost specifications. The economist’s way 
of viewing the world is in terms of markets (demand and supply interaction) for labour, capital, 
other input factors, and goods and services. These various kinds of markets interlock, which is 
described in the most complete manner in general equilibrium models. Markets solve complex 
coordination problems of distributed knowledge by signalling relative scarcity thereby guiding 
the plans of economic actors at the supply and demand side. This is what economists are 
preoccupied with. Neoclassical economics cannot provide the complete picture of transitions. But 
this is hardly a serious criticism. No single theory can cover the entire spectrum and complexity 
of long term transitions. . 
 Nevertheless, one can wonder whether dominant approaches in economics include the 
right variables and processes, and employ the correct behavioural assumptions, to study long-term 
transitions. The relevant processes will differ from case to case, as is already clear from the 
typology of transitions by Geels and Schot (2005). Economic studies may especially be criticised 
for giving little attention to changing institutions, which often will imply altering model 
parameters or structure. In order to identify and analyse the various transition processes as well as 
incorporate institutional dimensions, collaboration between economists, sociologists, business 
historians and other social scientists might be useful.   
 In addition, non-linearities and discontinuities play a role in transitions. Examples are the 
creation of new products and the emergence of institutions through agent interactions. Traditional 
equilibrium models with representative agents tend to underestimate such interaction effects. In 
this respect, agent-based models are more flexible and powerful. They allow for addressing 
gradual changes in the degree of interaction (or coordination) or gradual changes in behaviour, 
which in turn can lead to discontinuous changes (Rosser, 1999). Moreover, whereas the micro-
foundations in mainstream economics emphasise upward causation, a more realistic approach 
might be a combination of upward and downward causation (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). 
The latter seems to be consistent with the multilevel transition framework. It provides an 
opportunity to incorporate difficult issues relating to emergent phenomena, such as network and 
group formation and, appearance of new norms. 
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 Coevolution theories appear useful when attempting to understand the complexity of 
transitions. The transitions studies by Geels (2005) show that the relations between niches and 
regimes can be complex: existing regimes can make new niche developments difficult through 
competition with the established regime; niche development can, however, occur within a 
dominant regime (e.g., gas turbines were used within a coal regime before they overtook it); and  
niches outside a regime may benefit from certain regime features (e.g., the use of roads by non-
motorized transport). 
 Finally, economics has been criticized to be focused on efficiency or cost-effectiveness, 
cost-benefit analysis, and optimality and smooth changes, in contrast with transitions that involve 
uncertainty and discrete jumps. This view, however, oversimplifies matters. Even though in 
practice many people and firms focus on strategies that reflect short term efficiency (e.g., more 
attention for energy conservation than renewable energy), economic theory does not imply this.  
Neoclassical economics does not exclude a search for solutions that satisfy long term efficiency 
(e.g., possibly renewable energy). It is true, perhaps, that efficiency is often approached in too 
deterministic a manner, giving too little attention to uncertainty and irreversibility. On the other 
hand, advanced approaches to evaluation in economics, such as option value and real options 
theories, do address uncertainty explicitly (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Fisher, 2000).  
 Perhaps more important is that neoclassical economics assumes rational agents that show 
optimal behaviour. According to an evolutionary perspective, dynamic efficiency through new 
economic development may evolve from initially sub-optimal behaviour, namely from actors 
doing something different. As Peter Allen has said: “In an evolutionary landscape of hills and 
valleys representing levels of functional efficiency of different possible organisms, it is the error-
maker who can move up a hill, eventually out-competing a perfectly reproducing rival. And this 
despite the fact that at each and every instant it would be better not to make errors, since the 
majority are loss-making” (Allen, 1988, p. 107). Diversity is to be positively valued. The 
yardstick of (short-term) efficiency for policy action may not always be a good guide in an 
evolutionary world. Short term efficiency and long term efficiency may conflict, and diversity is 
in between. Neoclassical economics, however, does not attach value to diversity, but rather sees it 
as a cost. Incorporating diversity and the related themes of path-dependency (seen as irreversible 
change of diversity) and lock-in (seen as minimal diversity) into mainstream economics could 
mean an important contribution to transition research.  
Finally, economics has stressed that there are several market failures which cause a deviation 
between market outcomes and social welfare optima. These market failures include:  
• Missing markets: no markets for all goods and services. 
• Imperfect competition on some markets. 
• Economic activities generating externalities. 
• The existence of public goods. 
• Property rights being incompletely assigned. 
• Transactions not occurring under perfect information. 
• Bounded rationality: cognitive limitations and routines preventing firms from maximising 
profits and individuals from maximising their utility. 
• The presence of transaction costs. 
 
These various market failures have clear responses in terms of governmental policy or regulation. 
Economics offers concrete suggestions. In as far as transitions are hampered by such failures, 
economics can thus offer solutions. The most important lacking (system) failure seems to be path-
dependence and lock-in, but even in this case economists have been able to convert it into the 
neoclassical paradigm, namely as increasing returns to scale, i.e., a kind of positive externality 
(Gerlagh and Hofkes, 2002).  
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6. Conclusions 
The broad discipline of economics with its various sub-disciplines has much to offer for transition 
research. We have provided a broad overview here, without trying to create any personal 
selection bias, but instead allowing the reader to identify the concepts and theories of interest to 
facilitate stream-lined access to the specific economic literature that is relevant to certain aspects 
of transitions research.  A disadvantage of our approach is of course that it skims the literature, 
and as a result is abstract and brief in its account of concepts and insights. This approach is 
intentional. Only a book format might overcome this shortcoming. 
 It may come as a surprise to non-economists involved in transition research that 
economists in the past have already generated many ideas that relate to transitions. For example, 
they have elaborated in great detail the notion of multi-stage development (notably Rostow), 
which seems to be reiterated in recent multi-stage theories. Economics can make many useful 
contributions to the study of transition. Perhaps the greatest contribution economics can make to 
transition research concerns the role of markets and limitations of planning in transitions, and the 
choice of instruments of environmental regulation. For dealing with public ‘bads’, such as 
pollution, economists favour market-based instruments such as pollution taxes and emission 
trading systems. They help to deal with them in a decentralized manner by not prescribing choice, 
which helps to achieve total reductions in pollution in a low-cost manner. Institutional economics 
can help make visible undesirable incentive structures and propose alternatives. Spatial (regional, 
urban and transport) economics provides many insights about the geographical and multilevel 
nature of economic activities and mechanisms. Path dependency may be analysed through 
evolutionary-economic models that allow for the understanding of the processes of lock-in at the 
micro-level. In addition, economic models might be elaborated to address multi-level aspects of 
transitions, including processes at the level of niches, regimes and landscapes. Diversity might be 
given a place in economic analyses to move from short term to long term efficiency, thus 
allowing a trade-off of short-term costs of diversity (keeping options open) with long term 
benefits (because diversity generates new options in the future). Bounded rationality (habits, 
routines, imitation, rivalry, group norms) may receive more attention in economic analyses, as 
this often provides a more realistic depiction of the response of individuals to complexity and 
uncertainty, which is relevant in certain transition phases.  
 We have briefly addressed the potential friction between the dominant neoclassical 
school in economics and the aims of transition research. Some writers in transition research have 
noted this potential friction. Our position is that certainly neoclassical economics does not offer 
the complete perspective on transitions that a concrete, formal theory does. Neoclassical 
economics offers useful information on market processes and economic motives, but tends to 
neglect or treat implicitly cultural and certain institutional aspects of transitions. It can provide 
insight into the how transitions will indirectly affect the economy through interacting markets, 
prices, costs, sectors, and demand and supply, with implications for labour, capital and other 
input factors. This appears to be a promising area for transition research, in which models of 
transitions to a market economy can play a useful role. As to the issue of achieving welfare 
benefits through system innovation, some critics have suggested that the economist’s focus on 
efficiency or cost-effectiveness, using the tool of cost-benefit analysis, which prevents the search 
for uncertain, long term and discrete or non-smooth solutions and changes, and which means that 
there is no specific role for transition management. We feel that this oversimplifies matters. 
Economic theory does not prescribe short-term efficiency or optimisation. These are outcomes of 
the myopia of people, firms and governments that want to reap the benefits of investments as 
soon as possible. This exemplifies itself, for example, in the greater concern for energy 
conservation than for renewable energy. Perhaps efficiency is often approached in a too 
deterministic way, but on the other hand economics has developed advanced formal theories and 
models to deal with uncertainty and irreversibility, notably option value and real options theories. 
Perhaps what needs to be done is to extend these approaches to include the potential, future value 
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of diversity, so that ultimately a good trade-off between diversity and short run efficiency is 
feasible. Last but not least, economics has recognized the problems associated with path-
dependence and lock-in. They are in fact considered one of many market failures, namely as a 
positive externality. A third possible critique on mainstream economics is the assumption of 
perfectly rational agents giving rise to optimal choices and social outcomes (in theory). Here 
perhaps lies the weakest element of mainstream economics, which is currently under attack from 
the fields of behavioural, experimental and evolutionary economics, all of which offer useful 
alternative ways to approach market and strategic interaction and public regulation, for transition 
research. 
 Economics is concerned with optimality but is generally critical about planning as a way 
to achieve this. Governments should just improve the conditions under which decentralized 
decisions are made. The main contribution of mainstream economics is then perhaps that it offers 
specific insights about how to respond to a number of market failures that hamper transitions. 
Economists and technology researchers and historians seem to agree that governments cannot and 
therefore should not try to pick winners. It is better to rely on the (evolving) self-organisation 
capacity of institutions and markets, even when the operation of markets may occasionally lead to 
sub-optimal solutions through path-dependence resulting in a lock-in. Evolutionary economists 
would next to selection by markets see an important government role for stimulating or even 
contributing (through public R&D) to a variety of options, precisely because markets are myopic 
and guided by increasing returns to scale, thus running the risk of fostering (too) early lock-in.  
 Given the rich set of concepts, ideas and approaches identified here, economics without 
any doubt can play a useful role in transition research. Of particular interest are the sub-
disciplines of business cycle theory (long waves), development economics, economic history,  
economics of transition economies (former communist countries), economics of technology, 
environmental economics, institutional economics, public economics, and spatial economics. In 
view of this, a fruitful strategy would be to transfer relevant insights from each of these areas to 
transition research, and where relevant elaborate and synthesise them. This strategy would ideally 
involve interaction with experts from each of the sub-disciplines. 
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